A newspaper cartoonist, whose name is lost to memory, recently produced a two-panel drawing of Gen. Stanley McChrystal meeting the press. In the first frame the general says he needs at least 40,000 more troops in Afghanistan or the mission will fail. “What is the mission?” he is asked. “More troops,” the general replies.

As President Barack Obama continues his top-to-bottom review of our mission in Afghanistan, McChrystal has used his position as theater commander to lobby hard and publicly for a vastly expanded commitment.

The campaign commenced even as his report calling for an immediate boost in troops was being reviewed at the White House. Almost simultaneously, a copy somehow reached The Washington Post. That sent hawkish GOP senators onto the Sunday morning talk shows to insist that anything short of McChrystal’s request would put American troops in grave danger and risk handing victory to the Taliban.

Then, as the president began a patient, cautious review, the Pentagon threw in its two cents. Gen. David Petraeus, McChrystal’s boss and the father of counterinsurgency, endorsed his protg’s report, and Gen. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, went to Congress to do the same.

McChrystal, profiled on CBS’ “60 Minutes,” used the occasion to promote his strategy and also to complain that he had seen his commander in chief only once since being appointed to lead the Afghan effort in June. Defense Secretary Robert Gates cautioned the general that he was getting too public, but this mild rebuke only produced rumors that if Obama doesn’t satisfy McChrystal, the general might quit, creating a nasty dust-up with the Pentagon.

Since Petraeus produced his counterinsurgency field manual, it has become the Pentagon’s favored strategy for application everywhere. Remember what it calls for: an intensive troop commitment. Village-by-village efforts to win the hearts and minds of Afghans. A massive commitment of air and ground force to eliminate the enemy. A commitment to clear, hold and build to consolidate those gains.

Ultimately how many troops might be needed? McChrystal wants a down payment of 40,000, but his report on Obama’s desk owns up to as many as 80,000. Counterinsurgency strategy as promoted by Petraeus says it takes one security officer for every 50 in the population. That could mean up to 800,000 in Afghanistan as time goes on, and on, and on.

The White House review provoked former Vice President Dick Cheney to claim that the president was “afraid” to accept McChrystal’s strategy, and that his “dithering” was placing American troops in grave danger. After the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld national security team sent too few soldiers to Iraq with unarmed Humvees, you wonder who listens to Cheney anymore, except to make fun of him.

McChrystal has come untethered. Recently, he gave a speech in London promoting his plan, which was followed quickly by a summons from Obama for a face-to-face meeting aboard Air Force One in Copenhagen. The meeting was private, but it is presumed that the president cautioned his general that strategic advice should come through the chain of command, not through a public campaign.

Apparently, that did little good. McChrystal followed up his London speech with an unannounced appearance, just days ago, at the NATO defense ministers meeting in Bratislava, Slovakia. He got a unanimous endorsement from the defense chiefs, although many of the civilian governments in these countries are seeking ways to reduce their troop commitments.

With the support of the top brass at the Pentagon, conservative hawks in the GOP and Dick Cheney, McChrystal is clearly off the reservation. He is beginning to draw comparisons to another high-profile general who persistently defied his commander in chief. Although he knew it would create a firestorm — which it did — President Harry Truman took the heat and sacked the even more famous Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

Obama has a rogue general on his hands. He should consider doing the same.